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Abstract. Milton Friedman famously suggested that firms ought not divert profits toward
public goods because shareholders can better make these contributions themselves. De-
spite this, activist shareholders are increasingly successful in persuading firms to be
“socially responsible.”We study firm behavior when shareholders care about public goods
as well as profits and when managerial contracts reflect these concerns. Under these ideal
conditions, managers redirect more profits toward public goods than shareholders would
when acting separately—shareholders are poorer but happier. Further, so long as the
public good is sufficiently desirable, themanager selects the socially optimal level of output,
despite the mismatch between shareholder preferences and those of society at large.
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1. Introduction
Milton Friedman’s 1970 op-ed piece in the New York
Times Magazine offers the first, and perhaps the last,
word on the economics of corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR).1 To wit,
Insofar as [the manager’s] actions in accord with his ‘social
responsibility’ reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending
their money. . . .The stockholders could separately spend
their own money on the particular action if they wished to
do so. The executive is exercising a distinct ‘social re-
sponsibility,’ rather than serving as an agent of the stock-
holders, only if he spends themoney in a differentway than
theywould have spent it. . . .There is one and only one social
responsibility of business. . .to increase its profits. (p. 12)
Friedman argued that under perfect corporate gover-
nance, managers would (1) maximize profits, subject to
legal constraints, and (2) subsequently distribute all profits
to shareholders to do with as they please. Friedman ac-
knowledges that shareholders may value both profits and
‘social (public) goods,’ yet, analogizing to the known
superiority of cash over in-kind transfers in price theory,
he concludes that shareholders prefer fully decentralized
giving. In this paper, we show that Friedman’s ideally
governed manager does neither (1) nor (2).
The successor literature reconciles observed CSR to
theory via two lines of reasoning: One suggests that
agency problems are insoluble, so managers maximize
objectives other than shareholder value (see Garriga
and Mele 2004 for a survey). The other treats CSR as
a consumer demand shifter; thus, firms engage in CSR
to maximize profits. By contrast, we follow Friedman
in assuming that shareholders care about consump-
tion and public goods, but foreclose earlier arguments
justifying CSR—agency problems are absent, and
demand is independent of CSR.We also dispense with
other economic and behavioral distortions like double
taxation of dividends (Zivin and Small 2005) or warm
glow utility (Baron 2007) that others have pointed out
could motivate shareholders to use the firm as a vehicle
to discharge their social responsibilities.
In such a setting, managerial incentives are fully
aligned and corporate philanthropy produces no in-
direct benefits, yet socially responsible firms emerge.
Shareholders optimally direct the manager to sacrifice
profits, both directly through profit diversion and in-
directly by reducing output (and the resulting harms
like pollution from production). Shareholders end up
happier but poorer. The key to the result is that, be-
cause shareholders care about public goods, there is
scope for the manager to provide them if he can do so
more efficiently than shareholders on their own.
The first such efficiency comes from centralized
giving—the manager can play a key commitment role
on shareholders’ behalf. Shareholders recognize that
they face a free-rider problem when public goods con-
tributions are decentralized. Centralizing contributions
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through the firm helps solve this problem. Our first result
shows that, when managerial contracts account for
shareholders’mixedmotives, this leads to (1) diversion of
profits to public goods, (2) higher overall levels of the
public good, and (3) higher shareholder welfare. In this
frictionless setting, shareholders give the manager
complete decision rights over profit diversion because
he internalizes the positive externalities of these con-
tributions. Thus, as suggested by Coase (1960), when
externalities are present, property rights need no longer
be neutral—allocating the rights to the manager, who
serves as a commitment device, perfectly solves the free-
rider problem among shareholders. Although this
Coasian bargain does not account for the value of the
public good to nonshareholders, all citizens benefit from
the higher levels of public good generated by share-
holders’ centralizing giving at the firm level.
The manager’s control of production levels (and the
resulting negative externality to shareholders) leads to
the second efficiency. For instance, if shareholders care
about global warming, a plant that produces green-
house gases also affects their welfare. Shareholders
might simply incentivize the manager to maximize
profits and undo the environmental damage them-
selves, but this is never optimal. Shareholders always
do better by incentivizing the manager to produce less
than the profit maximizing output. To see why, con-
sider the benefits of the last unit of production. The
increase in profits is negligible, whereas the welfare
reduction owing to the externality is not. Although
shareholders can spend profits to reverse the externality,
it would clearly be more efficient to direct the manager
not to produce the output in the first place—throttling
back production can be an efficient means to provide
public goods that is unavailable to decentralized share-
holders. Thus, we identify a weakness in Friedman’s
assertion that a perfect manager will deliver maximum
profits to shareholders so that they may discharge their
social responsibilities in a decentralized way—profits are
not maximized nor are shareholder contributions com-
pletely decentralized.
Friedman suggested that increasing shareholders’
oversight of firms should curb costly CSR. However,
that hypothesis reconciles poorly with the recent in-
crease in both the manager’s accountability to share-
holders and CSR initiatives.2 Formal modeling reveals
that no reliable relationship between reducing agency
and CSR exists—it may well go up if shareholders’
collective marginal utility of giving exceeds the man-
ager’s. Hence, our model rationalizes the observed
simultaneous increases in CSR and shareholder con-
trol without requiring that CSR increase profits,
something empiricists have struggled to consistently
show (e.g., Margolis et al. 2009, Servaes and Tamayo
2013, and Flammer 2015). Although we acknowledge
that agency can drive CSR, and some firms “do
well by doing good,” our model rationalizes CSR in
many settings where these explanations do not apply.
The above intuitive results help explain why CSR
exists, itself a significant question in the strategy and
governance literatures. Our model also closely relates
to the theoretical literature on the private provision of
public goods, where it is central to ask how far short
various provision mechanisms fall compared to the
hypothetical choices of an ideal social planner. This
literature treats CSR as the production of a mixed
consumer good—that is, one with both private con-
sumption and public goods aspects. The earliest of this
work abstracts from firm behavior altogether. Cornes
and Sandler (1984, 1994) examine consumer choice
between a mixed good and a pure private consumption
good. Vicary (1997, 2000) studies the opposite case: the
choice between a mixed good and a pure public good.
Kotchen (2006) unifies the analysis, examining demand
for mixed goods when both pure private and pure
public goods are available. He finds that, when the
mixed good produces private and public goods as ef-
ficiently as their pure counterparts, the mixed good
always enjoys positive demand, but the resulting
public goods level is identical to the casewhere only the
pure goods are available.
Another literature strand models competitive firms
that engage in CSR to differentiate their products. In this
setting, Bagnoli and Watts (2003) show that, so long as
consumer warm glow utility is modest, mixed goods
underprovide the public good relative to first-best
levels. Besley and Ghatak (2007) remove warm glow
as a consideration and show that public goods levels
produced through CSR are identical to those under
a voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM).
In summary, the extant literature bundles consump-
tion and public goods to meet consumer demand; it
finds little to no improvement in public goods levels
over a VCM and no relationship between firms’ optimal
bundle composition and first-best actions of a planner.
Our model “bundles” shareholders’ (rather than
consumers’) consumption in two ways: (1) The man-
ager intentionally diverts some dividends to the public
good, and (2) profits and pollution are inextricably
linked by the production technology. We show that
when consumption and public goods are bundled for
shareholders, the firm diminishes the gap between
shareholder and social planner decisions—in fact, their
decisions perfectly align in one dimension. The social
planner will produce widgets until the marginal profits
equal the marginal damage of production, so long as
the public good is sufficiently desirable (i.e., she would
divert some profits to the public good). We show that,
so long as the manager would also divert some profits
to the public (albeit less than the social planner), he
chooses the same output as the social planner, despite
the fact that, from a social perspective, the manager’s
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incentives are misaligned. Intuitively, although manager
and social planner disagree on the absolute level of public
goods (and the amount of profit diversion), their re-
spective constituencies both think the level should be
higher than it is before firm activities begin, and fur-
thermore that the firm should efficiently provision
those goods.
Relatedly, Farrell (1985) models owner-consumers
whose consumption utility depends both on firm profits
and goods’ prices. He shows that, if every owner-
consumer’s fraction of consumption equals his own-
ership share, then shareholders unanimously want
marginal-cost pricing.Otherwise, production is inefficient—
the firm withholds goods despite consumer surplus
exceeding the cost of production. By contrast, we show
that much weaker conditions suffice to ensure that firm
output is socially optimal. So long as shareholders wish
the manager to spend positive amounts on the public
good, given optimal firm production, private and social
production incentives align perfectly.
Second, this interiority condition on direct giving
enables a sharp statement about the trade-offs be-
tween various production technologies. We propose
a hypothetical improvement—production can be made
either more cost-effective or comparably (in cost terms)
cleaner. Although instinct suggests that a planner con-
cerned about pollution would choose the latter over the
former, we obtain a neutrality result—both innovations
will produce the same overall level of pollution/public
goods by the socially responsible firm.
These two additional theoretical results are too
strong to be interpreted as empirically accurate—taken
literally, they imply that governmental regulation of
firm quantities (like a carbon tax) is superfluous and
that environmentally motivated subsidy dollars for
cleaner industrial processes might be better spent just
making it cheaper. Nevertheless, we provide bench-
mark results on bundling public and private goods for
shareholders in a frictionless environment that high-
light how important these common theoretical as-
sumptions are. These benchmarks have no analog in
the existing CSR or public goods literature driven by
consumer preferences for public goods.
To cleanly illustrate the paper’s main idea, the
baseline model is of a firm generating a fixed amount of
profits, owned by exogenous, identical shareholders.
To highlight the robustness of the intuitions, we then
generalize the model along several dimensions: by
introducing primary markets where CSR firms must
compete with traditional investments for startup cap-
ital and secondary markets where firm ownership
can change and outsiders with little concern for the
public good attempt to wrest control of the firm to
extract higher profits. Then, we endogenize the pro-
duction process—considering both its influence on
profits and externality on public goods. The case of
shareholders with general heterogeneous preferences
is reserved for Online Appendix B.1.3 Although these
variations alter some of the particulars of the results
above and uncover new results along the way, they do
not alter the overarching finding that shareholders
will intervene to reduce production below profit-
maximizing levels and redirect some of the firm’s
profits toward the provision of the public good nor that,
in many circumstances, socially optimal abatement oc-
curs. Formal proofs are removed to Online Appendix A.
2. Corporate Public Goods Contributions
2.1. Shareholders Delegate Contribution
To isolate the economic intuitions of interest, we begin
with a simple model focused on the role of the firm
in the classical “private provision of public goods”
problem. We will gradually generalize it to capture
more complex, novel, and realistic features, including
financial and product markets as well as production
externalities.
A firm is owned by n≥ 1 identical shareholders, each
with strictly concave, continuously differentiable util-
ity function u(c, g), strictly increasing in both private
consumption c and public goods quantity g. Although,
in principle, this public good could be anything whose
consumption is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, envi-
ronmental resources, like clean air and clean water,
will be our canonical example. The public good
should be understood to represent a composite—the
overall state of land, water, and air resources that
affect a shareholder’s quality of life. As such, the
construction/destruction of the public good repre-
sents additions and subtractions to this overall state,
but not necessarily focused on any one specific re-
source or location. For instance, production might
emit atmospheric pollutants or greenhouse gases,
whereas CSR expenditures might be spent on clean-
ing up the oceans. Both activities will affect the level
of the composite good, but differ in the precise
location and manner of the additions and subtrac-
tions. We assume that the public good is a normal
good. Throughout the paper we denote shareholders’
marginal utilities of consumption and public goods
uc and ug, respectively. Similarly, we use uxy to de-
note the second partial derivatives of u with respect
to x and y.
Initially, we abstract from production and simply
assume that the firm generates π profits to be dis-
tributed by the firm manager. Later, we will model
production that affects both profits and public goods
levels through externalities (like pollution).
We consider a two-stage game. In an initial (passive)
stage, the shareholders determine the manager’s con-
tract.4 Second, the manager chooses an amount α to
contribute to the public good, distributing remaining
profits equally among shareholders. Simultaneously,
Morgan and Tumlinson: Corporate Provision of Public Goods
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each shareholder contributes an amount, βi, to the
public good.5 After contributing to the public good,
payoffs are realized, with all remaining cash being
consumed by the shareholder. Throughout our anal-
ysis, we subsume shareholders’ initial wealth and the
initial level of public goods into their utility function,
because these do not change through our analysis.
Thus, we can write each shareholder’s utility as func-
tion of α and βi. In the spirit of Friedman, we suppose
that shareholders align the manager’s incentives with
their own preferences. The manager’s contract in-
duces him to select α to maximize the utility of a
representative shareholder.6 Thus, the manager’s objec-
tive function is
max
0≤α≤πu
π − α
n
− β∗i ,α +
∑n
j1
β∗j
( )
, (1)
where β∗i denotes equilibrium contribution of share-
holders to the public good.
Of course, not everyone in society is a shareholder.
There are N − n, potentially heterogeneous, non-
shareholding citizens. To isolate the effects of the
firm’s actions on welfare, we assume that citizens
neither have wealth nor do they receive dividends
from the firm.7 They do, however, benefit from the
public good—nonshareholding citizen i has continu-
ously differentiable utility vi (g), increasing and strictly
concave in its argument. Citizen i’s utility can be
similarly stated
vi
(
α +∑n
j1
βj
)
.
Notice that the manager is not simply a social planner
in disguise. He acts on behalf of shareholders, not
society at large. Whereas the planner accounts for the
preferences of the N − n nonshareholders in making
choices, the manager pays these individuals no mind.
As a consequence, a planner desires a higher public
goods level than the manager. Nevertheless we assume
that the planner cares enough about shareholders that
her contributions to the public good from firm profits
would not leave them with zero consumption. We use
the planner’s choices as a benchmark throughout our
analysis.
We characterize behavior in the voluntary contri-
butions game by shareholders conditional on their
beliefs that the manager contributes α˜. We then char-
acterize the manager’s contribution conditional on his
beliefs over shareholder contributions. The following
lemma shows that, given α˜, there is a unique equilib-
rium at the voluntary contributions stage, and, fur-
thermore, all shareholders contribute the same amount
(if any) in this equilibrium:
Lemma 1. Given any belief α˜, the voluntary contributions
game among shareholders has a unique, symmetric
equilibrium.
Because there is a unique equilibrium following ev-
ery belief α˜, and because beliefs are correct in equi-
librium, we can speak unambiguously about the
manager’s problem accounting for the strategic in-
teraction of shareholders.
Do shareholders benefit by delegating public goods
contributions to the manager? The following lemma
shows that, if shareholders contribute strictly positive
amounts to the public good, the answer is “no.”
Lemma 2. When all shareholder contributions are interior
(i.e., βi > 0), (beliefs about) manager contributions per
shareholder α˜i (where α˜i  α˜/n) crowd out private contri-
butions at a one-for-one rate. That is,
dβi
dα˜i
 −1.
The proof of the lemma follows directly from Bergstrom
et al. (1986).
On the surface, this well-known result would appear
to settle the matter: Shareholders precisely undo the
manager’s additional philanthropy, so delegation
seems pointless. However, the predicate of Lemma 2,
“when shareholder contributions are interior,” never
holds when the manager can contribute to public
goods. To see why, notice that whenever shareholder
contributions are interior, their marginal utilities of
consumption and public goods are equalized, an ad-
ditional unit of either gratifies them equally: uc  ug.
On the other hand, the manager can take a unit of
consumption from each shareholder (in the form of
a reduced dividend) and provide n units of public
goods to each shareholder. From the perspective of
the manager, who accounts for the positive impact
of public goods on all shareholders, a unit of public
goods is n times as valuable: uc < nug. Thus, when-
ever shareholders contribute themselves, the manager
always wants them to have more public goods, and,
hence shareholders’, contributions cannot be interior.
Themanager’s optimal public goods contributions crowd
out all private shareholder giving. The following
formalizes this intuition:
Theorem 1 (Delegation). When shareholders are identi-
cal, the following occurs: (1) No shareholder contributes
privately—all contributions are delegated to the manager.
(2) If shareholders would (not) contribute positively absent
manager contributions, then this delegation strictly (weakly)
raises overall public goods provisioning and shareholder
welfare.
Delegating contributions to the manager helps be-
cause he acts as a commitment device. By internalizing
Morgan and Tumlinson: Corporate Provision of Public Goods
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the benefits to all shareholders from the public good
and setting contributions accordingly, the manager
perfectly solves the free-rider problem from the perspective
of shareholders. Nonshareholding citizens also benefit
from this increased level of the public good, but note
that the level of public goods is still suboptimal from
a societal perspective—a social planner would also
internalize the benefits accruing to nonshareholders,
which the manager does not. Although complete del-
egation relies on the fact that shareholders are identical,
the manager’s commitment power remains potent even
when shareholders are heterogeneous (see Online Ap-
pendix B.1). In that case, at least one shareholder
delegates giving to the manager, and the overall
public goods level will exceed that when CSR is
prohibited.
We can sharpen Theorem 1 by adopting an as-
sumption common in the private provision of public
goods literature, namely, that relevant individual citi-
zens sufficiently desire public goods so that they con-
tribute strictly positive amounts to their provision (see,
e.g., Warr 1983, Andreoni 1990, and Bagnoli and Watts
2003).8,9 This interiority condition enables marginal
analysis of public goods levels. Without it, public
goods provision corners at zero, comparative statics
become troublesome, and the models are of reduced
interest. Because shareholders drink the same water
and breathe the same air as other citizens, it would
be equivalent to assume, absent any firm activity, that
shareholders would likewise contribute something to
the public good:
Condition 1 (Individual Fundability). Individuals enjoy
public goods enough to sacrifice some private consumption
for them. That is,
uc(0, 0)< ug(0, 0). (2)
Casual empiricism also suggests that this condition
holds for shareholders in practice: “Most (91.0%) high-
net-worth households gave to charity in 2015” (The
2016 U.S. Trust Study of High Net Worth Philanthropy).10
Although our results hold under Condition 1, a weaker
condition also suffices—the manager optimally contrib-
utes something to the public good from firm profits:
Condition 2 (Corporate Fundability). Shareholders enjoy
public goods enough to direct the manager to sacrifice some
dividends for them. That is,
uc
π
n
, 0
( )
<nug
π
n
, 0
( )
. (3)
To see that Condition 2 weakens Condition 1, compare
their respective mathematical statements (3) and (2).
Because ug > 0, ucc < ucg (follows from concave utility
and the fact that the public good is a normal good; see
Lemma 5) and n≥ 1, individual fundability implies
corporate fundability (but not necessarily the reverse).
That is, if individuals would ever contribute in
a decentralized manner, before the profits are gen-
erated, then they would definitely have a manager
make a contribution on their behalf, but he might
optimally contribute on their behalf even when they
would not do it on their own. Technically, corporate
fundability guarantees that the manager’s first order
condition (FOC) is satisfied in equilibrium (or is
cornered above) rather than individuals’.
The following corollary sharpens Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. When shareholders are identical: If corpo-
rate fundability holds, then (1) no shareholder contributes
privately—all contributions, totalling α∗ > 0 satisfying
uc
π − α∗
n
,α∗
( )
 nug π − α
∗
n
,α∗
( )
,
are delegated to the manager. (2) This delegation strictly
raises overall public goods provisioning and shareholder
welfare. If corporate fundability does not hold, then neither
shareholders nor manager contribute to the public good.
The “commitment device” intuition above would
seem to apply equally well to charities, but differences
in the source of funds break down this equivalence.
A firm generates profits, which management can re-
direct to the public good, whereas a charity relies on
voluntary contributions, which are subject to the free-
rider problem. Thus, the charity cannot replicate the
commitment function of the firm and hence is less
effective. More generally, an institution that relies on
individual contributions to provide public goods also
needs some sort of punishment mechanism to work.
There is a vast literature devoted to formulating such
mechanisms.11 Because the manager controls a firm’s
predistribution profits, member contributions, and
hence, such mechanisms, are unnecessary.
But this raises the question, “Did the free-riding
problem simply move outside the CSR firm?” More
pointedly, “Could such a firm raise startup funds?”
“Would shareholders flee the firm in search of higher
dividends?” “Could a takeover artist, who cares little
for public goods, profitably wrest control and change
the firm’s behavior?”We take these questions up in the
next two subsections.
2.2. Primary Equity Markets
In this subsection, we investigate whether a CSR firm
could raise enough funds to begin operations in the
presence of other investment opportunities yielding
better financial return.
Now assume there are N identical citizens with
utility u(c, g) as previously defined, each endowedwith
$1, which they must completely invest in period 0.
A bond, which pays π in each subsequent period, costs
Morgan and Tumlinson: Corporate Provision of Public Goods
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$1, and its net present value exceeds $1. There is also an
entrepreneur, with no money of his own, who has an
idea for a firm. It will generate nπ profits (net of all
payments to the entrepreneur) in each subsequent
period if it successfully raises $n in an initial public
offering (IPO) in period 0. Thus, a would-be investor is
indifferent between investing in the firm or the bond so
long as there is zero profit diversion in the former.
However, any corporate provision of public goods
reduces firm dividends strictly below bond returns.
Thus, we rule out the possibility of hidden profit
motives driving corporate giving. If n or more in-
dividuals subscribe to the IPO, n are chosen at random
to be shareholders at an IPO price of $1—the remainder
of the population invests in the bond. If the IPO suc-
ceeds, all players are informed of the outcome. Then,
the entrepreneur can divert some profits to the public
good before paying out the rest as dividends to the n
shareholders—he always makes this decision in the
best interest of shareholders. Simultaneously (with
the entrepreneur and each other), shareholders and
bondholders may contribute to public goods from their
dividends themselves if they wish. There is no saving,
and public goods expire each period. From Theorem 1,
we know that shareholders will prefer to delegate
contribution to the manager rather than contribute
privately, but we denote the contribution of each
bondholder by β.12 Here, we assume corporate fund-
ability holds, and hence shareholders direct themanager
to divert some profits to the public good. Were this not
the case (as when corporate fundability fails), the IPO
could succeed or not without any material difference to
either shareholders or bondholders and the analysis
would be of little interest.
If the IPO succeeds, then the entrepreneur will divert
α> 0 profits to the public good so that his FOC holds:
−uc π − αn , (N − n)β + α
( )
+ nug π − αn , (N − n)β + α
( )
 0,
(4)
and nonshareholders will chose to divert β≥ 0 from
their bond coupons such that their complementary
slackness condition holds:
β [−uc(π− β, (N − n)β+α) + ug(π− β, (N − n)β+α)]  0.
(5)
We will denote the utility of shareholders and non-
shareholders in this case US andUB. Observe that if the
square bracketed factor in Equation (5) equals zero (i.e.,
bondholders’ FOC holds), then π − αn<π − β, because
public goods are shared. Otherwise, β  0 (i.e., bond-
holders’ are cornered below and contribute nothing). In
both cases, all citizens enjoy the same level of public
goods, but the shareholders direct the manager to
contribute strictly more to the public good than they
would on their own—they are strictly poorer than
bondholders: UB >US.
If the IPO fails, all citizens will divert β¯≥ 0 from their
bond coupons to the public good so that their com-
plementary slackness condition holds:
β¯ [−uc (π − β¯ , Nβ¯) + ug (π − β, Nβ¯)]  0.
We denote the utility of all citizens in this setting asU∅.
To see that US >U∅, notice that the manager could
contribute nothing if he wished, and shareholders and
bondholders alike would contribute as if the IPO failed,
each enjoying U∅. Because shareholders optimally di-
rect the manager to divert some profits to the public
good, it must be thatUS >U∅. The following lemma
summarizes these observations:
Lemma 3. If the IPO is successful, bondholders are happier
than shareholders, but both are better off than if the IPO fails.
Formally,
UB >US >U∅.
The IPO amounts to a public goods provision point
mechanism—a game where individuals commit to
a specific action if and only if a sufficient aggregate
commitment threshold is reached. Unlike the standard
provision point game, IPO subscribers do not directly
“buy” the public good; rather, when the threshold n
subscribers is surpassed, the commitment power of the
manager partially overcomes the free-rider problem
and hence leads to increased public goods production.
Of course, because subscribers anticipate this, they act
as if buying the public good directly.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) first studied this class of
problems and characterize the set of equilibria. Bagnoli
and Lipman (1989) note that many of these equilibria
are implausible. They show that if one refines the set
of equilibria by eliminating dominated strategies and
imposing trembling hand perfection, then all imple-
mentable outcomes lie in the core. In terms of our
model, their result implies that, if the manager’s
commitment power is valuable, then CSR firms will
form. The need for refinements to obtain such a result
stems from the existence of unstable equilibria. For
example, if n≥ 2, then no subscribers is also an equi-
librium, as no individual can alter the outcome by
herself. To see that such an equilibrium is implausible,
imagine that individuals harbor a seed of doubt about
others’ behavior. In particular, if an individual believes
that there is any chance whatsoever that her decision to
fund the firmwill prove the difference between the firm
existing or not, then funding is a best response. The
reason is that, if fewer than n − 1 other individuals
decided to fund, the individual funding decision is
irrelevant. Moreover, as the probability that an indi-
vidual funds the firm goes to zero, the chance n or more
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others choose to fund (via trembles), is infinitely less
likely than the chance that n − 1 others choose to fund,
so individual funding is again optimal.13
If such extreme beliefs are ruled out, CSR firms arise
with positive probability in all remaining equilibria
(even without eliminating dominated strategies a la
Bagnoli and Lipman):14
Proposition 1. In all trembling hand perfect equilibria, the
venture is funded with positive probability.
It should be noted that there are
(N
n
)
economically
equivalent trembling hand perfect pure equilibria in
which exactly n individuals subscribe and the firm is
funded with probability one. (See Lemma 8 in Online
Appendix A for details.) There are also potentially
many mixed strategy equilibria (including a symmetric
one; see Lemma 6 in Online Appendix A) in which the
firm is funded with strictly positive probability less
than 1.
Having established that CSR firms can raise funds in
primary equity markets, but that shareholders after
such offeringswill experience “buyer’s remorse”—they
experience lower utility than their bondholding peers—
it is reasonable to ask whether the firm will retain
shareholders in the secondary market. We take up this
question in the next subsection.
2.3. Secondary Markets and Takeovers
So far we have assumed shareholders are “stuck”
holding shares of a CSR firm. In reality, shareholders
can trade their shares for cash and free ride rather than
paying for the public good through profit diversion.
A naive intuition suggests that were such markets in
place, the value of managerial commitment would
evaporate as shareholders exited, preferring to stand on
the sidelines. Here, we examine that intuition in detail.
To do that, we generalize the previous subsection’s
setting to include individuals who do not care about
public goods and examine the feasible trades on the
secondary market. Formally, suppose that there are
two types of citizens: (1) N civics (women) who care
about both consumption and public goods with utility
u(c, g) as described above, and (2)Mmaterialists (men)
who only like money. Although all citizens were civics
in the previous subsection, had we included pure
materialists, they would never subscribe to the IPO,
because doing so is always inferior to the bond for
them. Thus, immediately after the IPO there are three
types of citizens in equilibrium: (1) shareholding civics
(IPO civics), (2) bondholding civics (non-IPO civics),
and (3) bondholding materialists.
Finally, we assume that the manager is a utilitarian
on behalf of his shareholders and treats each share as if
it were held by a separate individual, be they IPO civic,
non-IPO civic, or materialist. That is, the manager’s
objective in choosing a contribution to the public good
is to maximize a convex combination of the types of
citizens’ individual utilities, weighted by each group’s
proportional shareholdings. Because before the sec-
ondary market opens all shareholders are IPO-civics,
they do not privately contribute (recall Theorem 1).
However, for later use, we denote IPO civics giving
before trading βˆ∗  0, and firm contributions before
trading α∗ > 0. Materialists never contribute. Non-IPO
civics may contribute positive amounts β∗ ≥ 0. Public
goods, then, can be written g∗  α∗ + (N − n)β∗ before
the secondary market opens. We will consider the
consequences of displacing an IPO civic by either
a materialist or non-IPO civic and whether a trade
between two such individuals is possible.
Can a materialist profitably buy out a civic share-
holder? First, note that such trade will strictly reduce
corporate contributions to the public good, because the
manager will dutifully adjust to the aggregate prefer-
ences of his new constituency: α∗M <α∗, where the M
subscript denotes the situation that a materialist has
displaced a non-IPO civic as shareholder. Thus, it is
possible that previously cornered IPO civics could
contribute positively after the trade: βˆ∗M ≥ 0. Suppose
that to acquire the share, the materialist buyer irra-
tionally offered the seller a price (i.e., fractional bond
equivalent) equal to the full future dividend of a share
p  π − α∗Mn (which is strictly higher than the current
dividend π − α∗n ). Observe that in this case, the IPO-civic
seller will have exactly the same pre-private-contribution
wealth as the remaining IPO-civic shareholders. In
particular, although she is no longer a shareholder,
the price the seller receives for the share exactly equals
the dividend that the remaining shareholders will
receive after the manager’s contract is rewritten; hence,
after the trade the seller is in the same financial position
as remaining shareholders. It then follows that the
seller’s private contribution, if any, is exactly the
same as the private contribution of remaining civic
shareholders. Further, because all civics equally enjoy
public goods, the seller’s utility will be exactly the
same as the remaining IPO civic shareholders’:
u
(
p − βˆ∗M , g∗M
)
︸︷︷︸
IPO civic seller
 u π − α
∗
M
n
− βˆ∗M , g∗M
( )
︸︷︷︸
Remaining IPO civic shareholders
.
Thus, the seller would only accept the buyer’s offer
if the remaining IPO civil shareholders are better off
when the materialist acquires the share. This contra-
dicts the principle of optimally: The manager’s presale
objective function was more skewed to the IPO civics’
ideal preferences than the postsale one. So, civics must
be worse off after the sale. Hence, the sale cannot occur.
Neither buyer nor seller are satisfiedwith the price—no
mutually agreeable price exists.15 We have shown the
following:
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Proposition 2. A materialist cannot profitably tender an
offer to a civic shareholder that she will accept. The firm is
immune to takeovers by profit maximizers.
Now, could a bondholding non-IPO civic buy out
a shareholding IPO civic? This question is pertinent,
because recall from Lemma 3 that immediately fol-
lowing the IPO, shareholding IPO civics are poorer
than bondholding non-IPO ones. Because public goods
are normal goods, these richer non-IPO civics would
actually prefer a higher-level public goods than poorer
IPO ones. Suppose a non-IPO civic offered an IPO civic
shareholder a price equal to the full current dividend of
a share p′  π − α ∗n . This trade would leave the wealth
of all parties unchanged prior to rewriting the contract
of the manager. The manager’s contract would change
because a poorer IPO civic would be displaced in his
constituency by a richer non-IPO civic, who wants more
public goods. Accordingly, the manager will contribute
strictly more to the public good: α∗N >α∗.
This will increase the total level of public goods. To
see this, consider each type of individual in turn. The
increased corporate giving will crowd out any private
giving by the buyer at a 1:1 rate (recall Lemma 2);
however, if this crowd-out is complete, her share of the
corporate contribution would strictly exceed her pre-
vious private giving. The increased corporate giving
will also crowd out any private contributions by non-
IPO civics not directly involved in the transaction, but
only partially, because they bear none of the cost of
increased corporate giving. Materialists never give.
Finally, IPO civics who do not sell continue give
nothing privately; thus, their implied contribution
to public goods through dividend diversion strictly
increases. Thus, every individual contributes, including
both direct contributions and dividend diversion, weakly
more. Further, IPO civics who do not sell their shares
contribute strictly more.
How does this increase in public goods affect vari-
ous parties’ welfare? Materialists experience no utility
change because they neither paid for the public goods
increase nor do they appreciate it. IPO civics who do
not sell subsidize the public goods increase that the
buyer desires, to a level above their optimum—they are
worse off. Nevertheless, this subsidy makes the buyer
strictly better off, though poorer. The seller enjoys also
an increase in public goods that she did not pay for.
Because price p′ makes both buyer and seller strictly
better off, there is a ball of prices around p′ under which
the trade will occur. We have shown:
Proposition 3. A wealthier civic will successfully buy out
a poorer civic. Corporate provision of public goods and their
overall level will increase.
Although we do not formally analyze any second-
ary market transactions beyond the first, the intuition
extends. First, a shareholder cannot merely shed her
burden of paying for the public good by selling her
shares—the burden (in the form of reduced dividends)
will be priced in by the market. Individuals who value
public goods less than current shareholders cannot
profitably buy share from someone who values it more,
because there exists no mutually beneficial trade. The
reason for this is that although a potential buyer could
influence the manager to reduce giving to the public
good and receive some of the cash equivalent from the
reduced level, he will only receive 1/nth of it, because
the remainder will be distributed to the remaining n − 1
shareholders. This is not enough to compensate the
seller for the full loss of the public goods from all
shareholders’ indirect contribution reductions. Poten-
tial buyers in our full information setting know this and
would demand compensation that the buyer cannot
rationally offer. On the other hand, individuals who
value the public good more can tender mutually
beneficial offers to individuals who value it less,
whether because of preferences or income effects. If
a buyer offered a price that equalizes the seller’s utility
at the current public goods level, this strictly benefits
both parties, because the buyer will use the commit-
ment power of the manager to get more public goods,
and the seller gets an income effect boost to utility
because she does not have to pay for the public goods
windfall. Furthermore, those who value the public
good least will be bought out first because their break-
even prices are lowest. Thus, although we have mod-
elled a simplified settingwith a limited number of types,
it is easy to see how the intuition carries forward and
how those that value the public good most will displace
those in a CSR firm who value it least, thus driving the
firm to be held by shareholders desiring similar, high
levels of public goods.
There are at least four caveats, however, to the above
analysis that should be noted. First, the primarymarket
analysis in the previous subsection does not compre-
hend the secondary market described in this one.
Observe though that its inclusion would only increase
the probability of a successful IPO, because any civic
who subscribed to the IPO and was selected would
recognize that, although she will be less well off than
civics who are not selected for the IPO, she will recover
some of this gap in the secondary market. This reduces
the anticipated “buyer’s remorse” and distributes the
cost of providing the ultimate level of the public goods
among civics who are not selected for the original IPO.
The second caveat is more practical: All of the
analysis in this subsection is premised on the fact that
an individual shareholder can costlessly exit from firm
ownership via themarket. In practice, such exit is far from
costless and, in many cases, is difficult or impossible. In
reality, individuals hold few shares; rather, institutional
investors—pension, mutual, sovereign wealth, and
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endowment funds—account for the lion’s share of
firm ownership (Rydqvist et al. 2014). By 2014, the
institutional ownership of S&P 500 shares had grown
to 82%.16 Although institutions do ultimately have
individual benefactors, those individuals cannot
costlessly choose an individual portfolio so as to
leave the burden of public goods provision on
others represented by the institution. In many cases,
represented individuals (e.g., Norwegian citizens or
Calpers pensioners) are, for practical purposes, exoge-
nously assigned shareholders with a collective fiduciary
agent communicating their wishes to management.
When there are significant costs associated with di-
vestiture or it is impossible, then simply treating share-
holders as exogenously assigned is reasonable.
Thirdly, our model does not allow managers to in-
fluence the type of investors they attract. Managers
seeking to influence the values of their investor pool use
positioning, advertising, and voluntary disclosure.
Comments by Unilever Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
Paul Polman are indicative of this last strategy. Speaking
at the first shareholder meeting after ascending to CEO,
Polman announced a holistic measure of, and motiva-
tion for, firm success. He indicated that investors un-
comfortable with this approach should “not put [their]
money in our company.”17 Polman was trying to select
his shareholding “employers” by announcing how he
intended to behave. The upshot of managerial strate-
gies of this sort is to homogenize the values and beliefs
of the firms’ investors.
Finally, in all of the analyses so far, we have assumed
that shareholders when acting individually have the
same technology for providing public goods as the
manager. Although that assumption may be reason-
able for direct provision of the public good through
charitable contributions, there are many ways in
which firms influence public goods that decentralized
shareholders could not. We take up these in the next
section.
3. Abating Production Externalities
In this section, we further generalize the model to
comprehend production externalities, like pollution,
which damage the public good in the pursuit of profits.
The shareholders described above possessed the same
technology to contribute to the public good as the firm,
but they chose to delegate action to the manager to curb
free-riding among themselves. Here, we add a production
process to the firm, which shareholders cannot in-
dividually influence, except through the manager’s
contract.18
Now, rather than generating a fixed amount of profit,
the firm produces and sells an amount q of a product.
Production generates π(q) profits, where π( · ) is con-
tinuously differentiable, concave, and strictly single-
peaked. Thus, there exists a unique profit maximizing
quantity qˆ (i.e., π′(qˆ)  0). Output also reduces the stock
of the public good. The replacement cost of this public
good is given by continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing function ψ(q) (ψ′(q)> 0). We assume that the
negative impact of a unit of production on the public
good and the effectiveness of a dollar spent on the
public good depends only on the current level of the
public good. For this reason, we refer to this setting as the
instantaneous cost model of public goods.19 Most standard
models of the private provision of public goods fall into
this class—all that is required is that public goods pro-
duction depends only on the sum of individual contri-
butions. We describe the microfoundations of this public
goods production technology in detail in Online Ap-
pendix B.3. We assume that the firm does not pollute
when idle (ψ(0)  0) and that the first unit of production
generates more profits than it costs to clean up the
resulting pollution (π′(0)>ψ′(0))—these conditions
guarantee that some q satisfying the manager’s first
order condition for output exists. In Online Appendix
B.3, we also derive necessary conditions for the second
order conditions (SOCs) to hold; however, convexity
(ψ′′( · ) ≥ 0) suffices.
Although we use pollution as our canonical exter-
nality, the tension we analyze is more general—the
model applies to settings where growing profits is
increasingly difficult relative to the social costs of
doing so. So, the firm might be a medical innovator
with a pipeline of products ordered ascendingly by
their expected health-benefit-to-risk ratio—it may
be obvious to pursue the first product, whereas each
successive positive decision is less easy. It could be
a textile manufacturer in a country that loosely regu-
lates the minimum age of workers—perhaps 18-year-
old workers are viable, but younger workers are slightly
more productive on a unit-cost basis but less safe and
will miss out on more schooling each year below that
age. Thus, although we formally model the manager’s
production quantity decision, quantity here need not
be taken too literally; he might also be choosing which
product releases to pursue, which ore bodies to mine,
or which production processes to adopt.
In this revised model, the manager simultaneously
chooses the production quantity q and an amount α to
contribute to the public good. The remaining profits
are distributed equally among the shareholders, who
then can contribute to the public good, if they wish;
however, because Theorem 1 established that share-
holders will delegate all public goods contributions to
themanager for an arbitrary level offirmprofits, theywill
make no private contributions in equilibrium. Share-
holders consume their dividends. The manager again
maximizes the representative shareholder’s utility
max
0≤q, 0≤α≤π(q)
u
π(q) − α
n
,α − ψ(q)
( )
. (6)
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Equation (6) clearly exposes the manager’s trade-off in
choosing output—more widgets means more profits
π(q) but also more pollution (i.e., less public goods
−ψ(q)). Recognizing that the marginal profits of output
eventually diminish to zero, for that defines the profit-
maximizing output, while its pollution continues to
increase, the manager abates production:
Proposition 4 (No Profit Maximization). The manager will
always produce strictly less than the profit-maximizing
quantity.
Friedman argued that a manager acting in the in-
terests of shareholders would maximize profits and
distribute the proceeds for shareholders to do with as
they please. Theorem 1 and Proposition 4 show that the
shareholders incentivize the manager to do neither—
optimal production is below profit-maximizing levels,
and some profits are redirected to the public good.
Moreover, neither result requires that the corporate
fundability condition hold.When it does hold, sharper
results are obtained. For instance, Theorem 1 to be
sharpened into Corollary 1. We derive an analogous
sharpening of Proposition 4 when this condition holds
in the next section.
3.1. Socially Optimal Abatement
Theorem 1 and Proposition 4 do not imply that, from
a societal perspective, the free-rider problem is solved.
The manager accounts for the positive externality among
shareholders, but not for the positive externality ac-
cruing to nonshareholders. Indeed, it follows imme-
diately from Theorem 1 that public goods would be
underprovided were society to rely only on the firm.
A similar argument would seem to apply to production
decisions as well, so one would expect the firm to
overproduce from a societal perspective.
Before exploring this intuition, consider the follow-
ing benchmark: Suppose that a social planner were
given full control of the firm and its profits. How much
would she optimally produce for the benefit of all
citizens? As in Theorem 1, shareholdersmake no private
contributions to the public good in this situation.
A utilitarian planner would maximize the aggregate of
shareholder and nonshareholder welfare,
max
0≤q, 0≤α≤π (q)
nu
π(q) − α
n
,α − ψ(q)
( )
+ ∑N−n
i1
vi (α − ψ(q)).
We assume that the public good is ex ante socially
desirable—that is, it is a “good” rather than a “bad” in
aggregate—so that the social planner will want to di-
vert some consumption from shareholders to public
goods before production occurs (q  0). Furthermore, if
it is desirable before production, then it is certainly
desirable at any positive output level (q> 0), because
production enriches shareholders (with diminishing
marginal utility of consumption) and depletes public
goods (likewise, the marginal utility of public goods
increases as their level falls).
The planner’s problemmay then be divided into two
parts: choosing the optimal production level and then
determining how much of the profit to redirect to the
public good. The following lemma deals with the
production decision:
Lemma 4. The socially optimal production level, q∗, is the
unique value of q solving π′(q)  ψ′(q).
Lemma 4 shows that the planner produces up to the
point where marginal profit equals the marginal cost
of repairing the damage to the public good.20 When
choosing the production quantity, the planner simply
asks, “Will producing another unit generate more
profits than it costs to clean up the resultant damage to
the public good?” If the answer is “yes,” then pro-
ducing the unit and paying to completely negate the
damage always makes society better off, regardless of
how the planner decides to use the leftover profits from
the additional unit. If the answer is “no,” and the planner
would spend any money at all, from any source, on the
public good, then regardless of what other decisions the
planner may make, she can save money and maintain
public goods levels by not producing the additional unit.
This intuition readily extends to a richer model where
the planner also controls factors beyond those directly
related to the firm, such as the ability to tax and re-
distribute income from citizens.
With this benchmark in mind, we now turn to
production when the manager controls the firm. First,
we must amend our corporate fundability condition to
take account of production:
Condition 3 (Corporate Fundability with Production).
Shareholders enjoy public goods enough at the socially optimal
level of production to direct the manager to sacrifice some
dividends for them. Formally,
uc
π(q∗)
n
, −ψ(q∗)
( )
≤ nug π(q
∗)
n
, −ψ(q∗)
( )
. (7)
Although the private provision of public goods liter-
ature does not generally incorporate the effects of firm
production on either individuals’ wealth or the public
goods level, it is clear that this version of corporate
fundability remains weaker than the standard indi-
vidual fundability condition for the reasons stated in
Section 2.1. That is, if shareholders would individually
contribute something to the public good before firm
profits and pollution, then they would surely have
their manager (who solves shareholders’ free-riding
problem) contribute on their behalf after production
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makes them personally richer and the environment
dirtier.
Figure 1 graphically captures how the features of
the model interact when the manager can use both
abatement and profit diversion to supply public goods.
First, notice that the allocation set under socially op-
timal production q∗ (hypotenuse of the bold triangle)
strictly dominates the allocation sets induced by all
lower production levels (including q′) because profits
grow faster than the cost of cleaning up the resultant
pollution. Thus, neither the manager nor the planner
will choose output in this range. Between q∗ and profit-
maximizing quantity qˆ (denoted by the dashed tri-
angle), the absolute size of the triangles continues to
increase because there are more profits to allocate, but
the allocation set shifts downward as the cost to clean
up pollution now grows faster than profits. Because
one unit of dividend from each shareholder buys n
units of public good, the slope of the manager’s (or
planner’s) allocation set is −n. The manager’s marginal
rate of substitution in trading off one unit of dividend
for a unit of the public good is MRS  −uc/ug. Thus,
corporate fundability, which can also be written
−
uc
π(q∗)
n , −ψ(q∗)
( )
ug
π(q∗)
n , −ψ(q∗)
( ) ≥ − n, (8)
holds if and only if (iff) the slope of the allocation set
(right-hand side (RHS) of Equation (8)) is steeper than
the manager’s MRS at the optimal level of produc-
tion and zero contributions to the public goods (left-
hand side of Equation (8)). Because the manager’s
indifference curves exhibit diminishing marginal
rates of substitution (DMRS), if Equation (8) holds,
then a tangency on the allocation set induced by so-
cially optimal production exists.21 Note also that the
planner’s MRS is everywhere shallower than the man-
ager’s because she also accounts for the benefits of
public goods to nonshareholders. Thus, we can sharpen
Figure 1. (Color online) Comparison of Optimal Allocation Decisions by the Manager and a Social Planner
Notes. Horizontal and vertical axes, respectively, denote the dividends per shareholder and public goods levels. The hypotenuse of each triangle
denotes the feasible set of allocations under a given production choice (q′ < q∗ < qˆ)—the upper left corner is an allocation where all profits are
diverted to the public good, and the lower left corner is an allocationwhere none are. So long as a tangencywith themanager’s indifference curve
exists on the allocation set induced by the socially optimal production level (q∗, in bold), then manager and planner agree on output, though not
public goods level. Max, maximum.
Morgan and Tumlinson: Corporate Provision of Public Goods
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–16, © 2019 The Author(s) 11
Proposition 4: If the corporate fundability condition
holds, then the manager and social planner make ex-
actly the same production decision and give positive
amounts (or is indifferent) to the public good. Formally,
Theorem 2 (Efficient Abatement). (1) The manager chooses
the socially optimal quantity q∗ iff the public good is cor-
porately fundable; otherwise, the firm overproduces (i.e.,
q∈ (q∗, qˆ)). (2) Furthermore, the manager provisions strictly
positive amounts of the public good iff the inequality in
Equation (7) is strict.
Theorem 2 offers tight conditions under which the
manager produces the socially optimal level of output.
If, at this level of output, shareholders would have the
manager contribute anything at all to the public good,
then his incentives are aligned with the planner’s in
terms of output. Although the preferences of share-
holders and society at large diverge in terms of the
amount of profits to divert to the public good, they
agree about how much abatement to undertake. To see
why, notice that there are two ways to buy a unit of the
public good: directly through the diversion of profits or
indirectly through abatement. The price of the direct
channel always equals 1, whereas the price of the
abatement channel, π′(q)/ψ′(q), varies depending on
the level of production. The abatement channel is
cheaper whenever q> q∗ and more expensive other-
wise. The corporate fundability condition ensures that
both manager and planner desire more public good
than can be efficiently provided using the abatement
channel alone; hence, both exhaust the gains from this
channel and then turn to the direct channel to achieve
their public goods targets. In short, provided the public
good is sufficiently desirable, government intervention
is unnecessary to solve the “missing market” problem
of the production externality.
Linkage Between Abatement and Profit Diversion. We
have highlighted two distinct levers by which a man-
ager may provide public goods for the benefit of his
shareholders: (1) directly, through diversion of profits,
and (2) indirectly, through pollution abatement via
restricted production. The former lever offers one mech-
anism (among others in the literature) to solve the free-
rider problem among shareholders, whereas the latter
offers a potentially more cost-effective method of pro-
viding public goods.
How important is it that the manager control both of
these levers? One might imagine that the two choices
are entirely separate, and hence removing one lever
from the manager’s control would not affect his op-
eration of the other. Suppose that the manager were
banned from diverting profits to the public good,
just as Friedman advocated. Obviously, this worsens
shareholder payoffs due to free-riding. But it doesmore
than this. Barring the manager from profit diversion
distorts his production decision: The manager now
optimally pares back production to a level below the
social optimum, q∗. Constraining one lever induces
a strategic response in employing the other. Formally:
Proposition 5. Suppose that individual fundability holds
and the manager cannot divert profits. The manager opti-
mally distorts output downwards compared with the social
optimum. The more widely held the firm, the larger the
distortion. Formally, let qn be the manager’s optimal output
when there are n shareholders, then d(q
∗−qn)
dn > 0, while
q1  q∗.
Why does the manager reduce output relative to the
social optimum when he is barred from diverting
profits? The key is that his shareholders still suffer from
the free-rider problem; thus, managerial actions that
increase public goods enhance welfare. The manager’s
only available lever to increase the level of public goods
is via output reduction. To see why such abatement is
optimal, consider a setting where the manager slightly
decreases output below the social optimum. Abate-
ment costs each shareholder 1nπ
′(q∗)uc but benefits this
individual by ψ′(q∗)ug owing to the increase in public
goods. Because shareholders give such that uc  ug in
equilibrium and π′(q∗)  ψ′(q∗) by definition, it then
follows that themarginal benefit of abatement, which is
independent of the number of shareholders, exceeds
the marginal cost, which is decreasing in n. Because
shareholders task the manager with maximizing their
aggregate welfare, this trade-off is worthwhile.
Note however that it would be more cost-efficient to
pay for the public goods directly, because the implicit
price of public goods via abatement, π′(q)/ψ′(q), ex-
ceeds that from direct contribution, which equals 1.
Unfortunately, the manager lacks the direct contribu-
tion lever and substitutes abatement in its stead. How-
ever, if the game timing changes, such that the manager
chooses and shareholders observe production before
shareholders contribute, such that the manager can
commit, socially optimal production again is obtained
(see Online Appendix B.4).
When corporate fundability fails, the manager has
no interest in diverting profits when producing at q∗, as
the public goods level is already too high. Increasing
production raises consumption at the cost of the public
good, a perfectly acceptable trade-off. Indeed, because
the manager does not divert profits in this situation,
he chooses precisely the same output as when the
additional lever was present. Nevertheless, although the
manager’s output choice is higher than the socially
optimal in this case, it remains below the profit-
maximizing level.
We have shown that giving the manager the right to
divert profits not only solves shareholders’ free-rider
problem, but it also enables him to optimally choose the
same output as the planner. However, the dependence
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is not bilateral—the manager’s power as commitment
device to ameliorate free riding does not depend on his
control over production. Indeed our baseline model of
Section 2, fromwhichwederivedTheorem1 andCorollary
1, abstracted from production altogether.
The prior literature makes the extreme assumption
that shareholders only care about private consumption.
Here, we allow shareholders to also enjoy the same
(composite) public good as nonshareholding citizens,
albeit perhaps to differing degrees. Although share-
holders solve the free-rider problem amongst them-
selves, independent of nonshareholder preferences, to
the extent that the interests of shareholders diverge
from nonshareholders, the benefit they derive from
shareholder coordination may be limited. For example,
shareholders may care intensely about the environ-
ment, whereas nonshareholders might primarily care
about working conditions. The firm will “solve” the
first problem but pay little attention to the second. This
divergence of interests does not impact efficient pro-
duction abatement—production is socially optimal so
long as nonshareholders’ utility does not strictly de-
crease when shareholders’ preferred component of
public goods increases.
If society were comprised of a single individual, then
free-riding would not be a concern—it only arises when
there are more than one. So, one might analogize that
optimal production is similarly easy to achieve under
monopoly, but when firms compete, might they not free-
ride in their production decisions so that total output (and
consequent pollution) is too high? In a companion article
(Morgan and Tumlinson 2018), we consider the opposite
case: We study a perfectly competitive small open
economy where managers of many competing firms
produce the pollution generating good, and the world
market determines its price. Our efficient abatement re-
sult carries through in this setting—both the number and
production of firms is socially optimal.
4. Technology Subsidies
In this section, we examine another policy consequence
of the (monopoly) model. TheU.S. government devotes
billions of dollars each year to subsidizing basic re-
search. Often, this funding is targeted toward tech-
nological breakthroughs deemed to have significant
social benefits. Recent “cleantech” initiatives in the
energy sector are prime examples. Suppose that the
government could choose to subsidize technology
development to either (1) make production cheaper
or (2) make it cleaner. A government worried about
emissions would likely opt for the latter. Indeed,
subsidizing cheaper production would seem to only
exacerbate the pollution problem by generating higher
output. This, however, ignores the connection between
production technology and themanager’s contract. The
following proposition shows that, when the corporate
fundability condition holds, the two investment strat-
egies are neutralwith respect to public goods provision.
This implies that society may be better off investing
in technology that makes production cheaper rather
than cleaner, if developing the former technology is
less expensive.
In order to make the two technology changes com-
parable, consider the following. Suppose that, under
the cleaner technology, firm emissions from output q
reduce cleanup costs by a given amount. For instance,
a coal-fired power plant might reduce the amount of
harmful pollutants emitted per kilowatt of power
generated by installing scrubbers on its smokestacks.
Alternatively, it might install a labor-reducing fuel-
delivery system, and for every level of output, the
value of the labor savings exactly equals value of the
reduced pollution in cost-to-cleanup terms. Under both
regimes both regimes, the firm incurs the same fixed
costs—the technological improvements only matter
when the firm is actively producing. Formally, let ψˆ
and πˆ denote the cleaner andmore efficient technology,
respectively. Then, π(0)  πˆ(0) and for all q less than
the profit-maximizing quantity (∀q : πˆ′(q) ≥ 0)
πˆ(q) − π(q)  ψ(q) − ψˆ(q),
or, expressed in marginal terms,
πˆ
′(q) − π′(q)  ψ′(q) − ψˆ′(q). (9)
Our next result establishes the neutrality of comparable
technological changes.
Proposition 6 (Technological Neutrality). Suppose corpo-
rate fundability holds. Then, firm output is identical under
the cleaner or cheaper technology. Furthermore, total public
goods are identical under the two technology improvements.
The underlying intuition analogizes to the familiar
trade-off between more revenues and lower costs.
The corporate fundability condition ensures that the
manager chooses output where marginal profit equals
the marginal externality—that is, π′  ψ′. This is
equivalent to choosing q to maximize π(q) − ψ(q),
where π(q) may be viewed as a revenue function and
ψ(q) as a cost function. Under this view, the cleaner
technology represents a reduction in marginal costs,
whereas the cheaper technology represents an iden-
tical increase in marginal revenues. Because the man-
ager only cares about the net of revenues and costs, both
changes have the same effect on “profits” and hence
output. The manager also chooses between consump-
tion and public goods along the budget curve induced
by the output decision. Because the relative price, and,
indeed, the budget set itself, is unaffected by choice of
the technological change, the final choice of consump-
tion and public goods provision is also identical under
the two schemes.
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5. Conclusion
We have shown that when shareholders care about the
public good, even if only to the extent that the public
good personally affects themselves and not others, and
these preferences are reflected in the manager’s con-
tract, then firms abandon profit/dividend maximiza-
tion in favor of more socially responsible choices. In
particular, a firm will refrain, to some degree, from
production that harms the stock of the public good and
may divert some of its profits towards repairing the
damage to the public good caused by its production.
When shareholders care sufficiently that they person-
ally would contribute to the public good, the firm’s
activities become even more laudable—production
occurs at the same level that a utilitarian social planner
would choose, despite the fact that the manager’s
contract only reflects the preferences of shareholders
and not the public at large. In addition, the firm diverts
profits to increase the public good—its profits are
lower, its shareholders are poorer—and this is precisely
as its shareholders intend.
There is considerable evidence of many of the ac-
tivities predicted by the model. Shareholders are
strongly voicing their preferences concerning the social
behavior of firms, not merely fringe groups with token
holdings, but large institutional investors. The New
York City Comptroller’s Office, representing the pen-
sions of over a half-million beneficiaries and current
employees, spearheaded the campaign that led Intel,
Apple, Microsoft, and Hewlett-Packard to address
environmental and human rights issues in their supply
chains in 2012.22 Firms are altering or reducing their
production so as to limit negative environmental or
social impacts, and these distortions are genuinely
costly. In Intel’s case, hundreds of millions of dollars
have been spent onwater conservation and green energy.
Apple agreed to split the costs of improving working
conditions in the plants of its main manufacturing
partner, FoxConn—moves that nearly halved the sub-
contractor’s profit margins.23
Firms also routinely divert profits toward activities
that offset some of the damage caused by their activ-
ities. For example, Barrick Gold’s operations in its
Pueblo Viejo mine, located in the Dominican Republic,
created environmental damages estimated to cost $75
million to rehabilitate. Despite being obliged to pay
only half the cost of the cleanup and to remediate at
Dominican standards, Barrick voluntarily paid the full
cleanup cost, performed to international standards, and
even cleaned up nearby areas only indirectly affected
by the mine. These voluntary efforts cost shareholders
at least $37 million in foregone profits.24
Although these impressive activities suggest that the
modeled forces are at work, to some extent, at some real
firms, such prosocial behavior is hardly ubiquitous.
This shortfall can be measured on a different scale as
well. Taken literally, the model predicts little need for
regulatory efforts on the part of agencies like the En-
vironmental Protection Agency. Likewise, it predicts
little need for carbon-pricing schemes like cap and
trade. Yet the scientific consensus is that efforts to date
to reduce carbon emissions are insufficient to halt, or
even slow, the rapid accumulation of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere and the resultant rise in the earth’s
temperature. Regulatory intervention was (and is)
needed to ensure against catastrophic seismic activity
from the extraction of shale oil and gas. Thus, it seems
clear that the sharpest predictions of the model are not
borne out, by and large. Thus, one might be tempted to
conclude that studying such settings theoretically serves
little purpose.
Like other sharp results that fail in the real world,
such as the revenue equivalence theorem (RET), the
exercise represents a starting point from which to ex-
amine the various assumptions required to obtain the
outcome. In the case of the RET, one needs things like
risk-neutrality and the absence of asymmetries among
agents—conditions unlikely to hold in practice. In our
case, we require that the fundability condition hold,
and, perhaps even more importantly, we require the
ability of shareholders to write forcing contracts
commanding the manager to adhere to their tastes.
Shareholders must also solve a coordination problem
to determine what those tastes are in the first place.
Managers must know the profit and externality func-
tionwith precision.25 And so on, as needed to study our
“frictionless” world.
However, like all models, ours suffers from the fact
that none of these assumptions is exactly true in
practice, yet studying the frictionless world is still
a useful benchmark for directional predictions about
the corporate provision of public goods. For instance,
themodel predicts, implicitly, that as shareholders gain
more control over the actions of the manager, the firm
will pay more attention to production externalities,
which is broadly in line with what we see. The model
also predicts that when shareholders are little affected
by the firm’s polluting activities, there will be little
clamor for abatement. This, too, is roughly in line with
what is observed. For instance, Grant et al. (2004) find
that absentee managed plants in the United States emit
more toxins, on average, than other plants. Yet there
is a growing sense that firm emissions affect every-
one, rather than those who happen to be downwind,
expressed most acutely in worries about global warm-
ing. Campaigns urging major institutional investors
to divest themselves of fossil fuel producers offer a vivid
example of these far-reaching concerns. Today’s share-
holders are farmore aware of, and vocal about, the harms
from firm production than those of the previous gener-
ation. As technological progress continues to make us
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ever-more interconnected, and interdependent, there is
every reason to believe that public goods will figure even
more prominently among the considerations of the next
generation of shareholders. Thus, even though the con-
ditions for firms to choose the socially optimal abatement
level are unlikely to be borne out in practice, knowing
what these conditions are is, nonetheless, valuable for
anticipating the effects of such changes.
This growing connection between shareholders’ in-
terest in public goods and their exercise of power
within the firm requires a rethink of certain govern-
ment policies. For instance, government spending to
clean up pollution must now account for their impact
on CSR activities at the firm. Naturally, such grants
have a crowding-out effect on firm production of public
goods, including abatement activities. Thus, the net
impact of such grants is blunted by an offsetting re-
duction in the social value orientation of firms through
shareholder actions.
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Endnotes
1 Friedman articulates similar sentiments in greater detail in his ac-
ademic text, Capitalism and Freedom (1964).
2The SEC’s adoption of Rule 14a-8 (the shareholder proposal rule) in
1943 opened the way for direct shareholder activism, but the rise of
activist institutional shareholders, especially pension funds in the
mid-1980s and more recently hedge funds, has increased shareholder
oversight of firmmanagement (Gillan and Starks 2000). Furthermore,
the percentage of outside board directors has steadily risen since the
early 1970s (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988; Borokhovich et al. 1996,
table 1; Dahya and McConnell 2005). Similarly, board-driven CEO
turnover has increased since the early 1990s (Kaplan and Minton
2012). Laws like the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) and Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform (2010) in the United States and Shareholders
Rights Directive (2007) in the European Union have increased
management accountability to shareholders.
Shareholders are using this power. Proxy fights, once rare, now
occur regularly at annual shareholder meetings. For instance, about
300 proxy wars were waged within Fortune 200 companies in 2012
(http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2012Finding3.aspx). Largely,
these shareholders request policies reflecting preferences beyond
mere profit maximization. In 2012, Ernst & Young predicted that,
among shareholder resolutions, “the environmental and social
proposals category looks to dominate all other[s]. . .for a third con-
secutive year” (Ernst & Young LLP, 2012, Leading Corporate Sus-
tainability Issues in the 2012 Proxy Season: Is Your Board Prepared?).
Regarding impact, U.S. sustainability organization Ceres observed
that of the nearly 110 resolutions it tracked in 2012, 44 resulted in
U.S. companies committing to tackle environmental and social risks
in their operations and supply chains (http://www.ceres.org/press/
press-releases/shareholder-resolutions-spur-u.s.-companies-to-act-on
-sustainability-during-2012-proxy-season).
3Although modeling heterogeneous shareholder preferences in-
troduces considerable technical complexity, the economic intuitions
and core results change very little.
4One might worry that in a large public company, each shareholder
accounts for only a tiny fraction of holdings and hence cannot
influence the manager. In reality, large institutional investors own
most shares (see Rydqvist et al. 2014). Such investors can clearly
influence the manager.
5One might argue that dividends need to be distributed before
shareholders can contribute from them to the public good and
consume, and thus the timing should be sequential. In fact, dividends
are generally paid every quarter, and firms and individuals donors
make contributions at various points in the cycle. Hence, no timing is
clearly better than another. We follow Bergstrom et al. (1986) and
many others by assuming simultaneity, but a sequential timing does
not yield qualitatively different results.
6Formally, shareholders specify a forcing contract dictating α..
7This assumption is innocuous. Online Appendix B.2 relaxes it and
shows that the results are unaltered.
8There have been many extensions of these models, many of which
relax preference assumptions. For example, Bergstrom et al. (1986)
divide consumers into contributors or noncontributors to the public
good. Their main result (theorem 1) focuses solely on contributors,
where marginal analysis obtains. Our various fundability conditions
are in the same spirit. They ensure interior solutions and hence allow
for marginalist analysis.
9Other papers do not explicitly assume interior giving, but, instead,
impose restrictive preferences that produce interior giving (e.g.,
Vesterlund 2003).
10http://www.ustrust.com/publish/content/application/pdf/GWMOL/
USTp_ARMCGDN7_oct_2017.pdf
11The most well-known mechanisms are those proposed by Groves
and Ledyard (1977), as well as Ledyard (1994), but there are many
others. A charity could, in principle, adopt any of these mechanisms
to solve the free-rider problem. A government can deter free-riding
(tax-evasion) with the threat of force.
12 Symmetry and uniqueness of bondholders ′ contributions follows
a proof analogous to that of Lemma 1.
13There are other noncore outcomes representing equilibria where
n − 2 or fewer individuals decide to fund and the rest do not. An
analogous argument shows that these equilibria do not survive
trembles.
14An important difference between Bagnoli and Lippman’s game and
ours is that in their version, any single individual can fully fund the
public good. Trembles alone, then, do not suffice to rule out noncore
equilibria. Because such individual funding is a dominated strategy,
Bagnoli and Lippman tack on a restriction whose trembles consist
solely of undominated strategies to rule this case out. Our model, on
the other hand, does not need this strengthening of trembling hand
perfection, because being a shareholder is strictly preferable at the
individual level to the firm not being funded.
15An alternative intuition is as follows: Observe that the net effect of
such a transaction is merely to shift some amount of the public good
into cash. The potential buyer would only receive 1/nth of the cash,
because the remainder will be distributed to the remaining n − 1
shareholders. The potential seller must be compensated for the full
loss of the public good. Were the firm completely owned by civics,
then the level of the public good would be such that 1n uc  ug. Thus,
in this case, if the amount of public good converted to cash were
negligible, and the seller received all of the generated cash due
a single share (1/nth of the total), she would only be indifferent to the
transaction. For any measurable reduction in the public good, the
potential seller would strictly reject the deal: 1n∫ uc < ∫ ug. If any existing
shareholders valued public goods less than the potential seller, then
1
n uc <ug, and the potential seller would reject even a negligibly sized
trade, much less a larger one. Because these trades already assume
that the buyer gives up all cash generated by converting the public
good, and sellers are strictly worse off, there can be no mutually
beneficial trades.
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16http://www.spcapitaliq-corporations.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/
2014/08/GMI-SPIAS-Institutional-Ownership-Is-There-Smart-Money
-Erin-Gibbs.pdf
17https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyboynton/2015/07/20/unilevers
-paul-polman-ceos-cant-be-slaves-to-shareholders/#186d3ad7561e
18Kaul and Luo (2017) show that when a firm’s core business has
positive externalities for the production of social goods, such syn-
ergies may make the firm’s provision of these public goods more
efficient than alternatives. Here, the situation is quite different—the
firm’s core business destroys the public good.
19One might imagine a model of public goods production where the
cost of adding a unit depended on, say, how much money had been
spent on public goods provision already. Then, the cost of public
goods would depend not only on their level, but how that level was
achieved. We specifically rule out such path dependencies.
20Although other definitions of the socially optimal level of pro-
duction exist, this one has been common in the literature since Pigou
(1920). However, it is important to recognize throughout the analysis
that q∗ denotes the socially optimal level of production, not the so-
cially optimal level of public goods.
21DMRS follows from the concavity of the utility functions and the
assumption that consumption and public goods are normal.
22http://www.pionline.com/article/20120209/ONLINE/120209850/
new-york-city-plans-target-3-tech-firms-for-human-rights-compliance
23http://venturebeat.com/2012/05/10/apple-foxconn-to-split-costs
-of-improving-factory-working-conditions/
24http://barrickbeyondborders.com/environment/2010/04/greener
-mining-environmental-clean-up-in-the-dominican-republic-reflects
-modern-industry-approach/
25A primary objection to implementing so-called Pigouvian taxes
(1920) to induce socially optimal output q∗ solving π′(q∗)  ψ′(q∗) is
that the information about the profit function π and the externality
function ψ are private to the firm. Although the firm may not know
these functional forms, it is not unreasonable to assume that it is better
informed than a government with taxing authority.
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